Hospital Privileges Revisited by Perr, Irwin N.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1960
Hospital Privileges Revisited
Irwin N. Perr
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Medical Jurisprudence Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Irwin N. Perr, Hospital Privileges Revisited, 9 Clev.-Marshall L. Rev. 137 (1960)
Hospital Privileges Revisited
Irwin N. Perr, M.D.*
T HE EXTENT OF THE RIGHT of the physician to practice medicine
in a hospital is a socially important problem which has been
the subject of many legal cases. In a previous article in this re-
view it was contended that a physician has a right to practice in
any hospital of his choice, the express statement being made that
present policies are detrimental to public welfare. The issue (at
least in part) as then presented was this: '
Do the hospitals exist primarily as corporations (busi-
ness entities), of primary concern only as "private preserves"
governed solely as their administrators wish? ...
Put otherwise, the issue is: Do doctors exist for the con-
venience of hospitals, or hospitals for the convenience of doc-
tors? Should public interests or hospital management inter-
ests come first?
The answers are obvious. The law as it is now is con-
trary to the public's interests.
The purpose of this discussion is to elaborate upon and, hope-
fully, to clarify many of the issues involved in this delicate prob-
lem. To do so, existing law will be reviewed, with special atten-
tion directed to the reasons (good or bad) for the law as it stands.
If the issues could be condensed into one statement, it might
be this: Inasmuch as the primary purposes of the hospital are
to treat the ill, to do research into the causes of illnesses, to de-
velop better methods of treatment, and to train those who must
administer to the sick, how can these purposes best be accom-
plished, so that the hospital and the doctor can do their work
most efficiently in order that patient care will be maintained at
the highest possible level?
This statement is somewhat long and offers little in the way
of explicit legal problems, but it highlights a social problem with
legal ramifications in many directions.
When one attempts to analyze a certain trend in law, one
must ask several basic questions:
1-What is the present law? If there is a general uniformity
of opinion, what factors have led to such agreement?
2-What are the defects of existing policy and existing law?
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3-If defects in the social system are present, to what degree
are they present? Are the remedies to be sought through social,
economic, political, or legal action? To determine this, who are
the persons allegedly injured and what specific problems are in-
volved in such cases?
4-If legal action is needed to correct any injustice, what is
the legal remedy to be sought?
5-If the remedy sought is adopted, what will be the defects
of the alleged remedy? Will the alleged remedy create more
inequity than existed previously?
As applied to this subject, to answer these questions in de-
tail would require a volume. Therefore, the problems will be
presented merely in a brief factual manner (hopefully, but doubt-
fully, impartial). Some aspects will require some elaboration.
The reader may ponder this presentation and then attempt to
answer for himself the questions just listed.
Private and Public Hospitals
The law distinguishes between private and public hospitals,
although it will be seen that there is much overlapping.
To put it simply, the private hospital generally is a private
corporation with the rights and privileges allowed by law to such
entities. Public corporations are instrumentalities of the state,
founded and owned by it in the public interest, supported by
public funds, and governed by managers deriving their authority
from the state; while corporations organized under legislative
permission, but supported mainly through voluntary gifts, per-
forming duties similar to those of public corporations, and en-
gaged in charitable work, though affected with a public interest
and receiving donations from the government are "private cor-
porations" and not "public corporations." 2 A hospital, although
operated solely for the benefit of the public and not for profit,
is nevertheless a private institution if founded and maintained
by a private corporation with the authority to elect its own offi-
cers and directors. 3 If the hospital be subject to public authority,
state or municipal, it is more likely to be a public institution, but
if the hospital be supported by patient fees or if the only public
support is by contract for the care of the indigent, then it is pri-
vate. In Eaton v. Board of Managers of James Walker Memorial
2 Hughes v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 289 Ky. 123, 158 S. W. 2d 159 (1942).
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 671, 4 L. Ed.
629 (1819). See also Natale v. Sisters of Mercy, 243 Iowa 582, 52 N. W. 2d
701 (1952); Levin v. Sinai Hospital of Baltimore City, 186 Md. 174, 46 A. 2d
298 (1946); Edson v. Griffin Hospital, 21 Conn. Sup. 55, 144 A. 2d 341 (1958);
West Coast Hospital Ass'n. v. Hoare, 64 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1953); Akopiantz v.
Board of County Com'rs, 65 N. M. 125, 333 P. 2d 611 (1958).
3 Washingtonian Home of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 157 Ill. 414, 41 N. E.
893, 29 L. R. A. 798 (1895).
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Hospital4 (discussed below), the hospital received public funds
amounting to only 4.6% of its income, and this was on a con-
tractual, not a contributory basis. Courts usually will not inter-
fere with the internal management of a corporation, but will
leave questions of policy and management to the honest decisions
of the officers and directors, and this rule applies to private hos-
pitals.5
Public Hospitals
Turning for the moment to public hospitals, there is some
variance in the application of rules, due to both statutory prob-
lems and corporate stipulations. Licensing of a physician by a
state gives him no absolute right to membership on the medical
staff of a public hospital; the board of a public hospital has the
right to oust even a licensed physician for violation of the board's
rules, which however must be fair and reasonable, with notice
and a hearing in accordance with due process of law. The board
of a hospital may oust a licensed physician from staff member-
ship, for example, on the ground of lack of medical skill.6
In the Dayan case, a physician was removed from the associ-
ate medical staff after fourteen years. Fourteen charges were
filed against him; thirteen were upheld (nine unanimously, four
by majority vote). The court said that obviously a refusal to
abide by the rules and regulations of a hospital might bear no
relation to the physician's professional competence, yet make him
unacceptable as a staff member. While licensing by the state is a
prerequisite to staff membership, it is not the only condition. The
physician here was removed for lack of competence; the court
rejected the physician's claim that he should be sole judge of his
own competence in surgery and obstetrics as well as general
practice, and stated that it is hardly surprising that the physician
failed to find approval, personally or socially.
4 Eaton v. Board of Managers of James Walker Memorial Hospital, 164 F.
Supp. 191 (D. C. N. C., 1958), aff'd. 261 F. 2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958). See text
below at note 32.
5 Edson v. Griffin Hospital, supra, n. 2.
6 Dayan v. Wood River Twp. Hospital, 18 Ill. App. 2d 263, 152 N. E. 2d 205
(1958); see also Green v. City of St. Petersburg, 154 Fla. 339, 17 S. 2d 517
(1944); Alpert v. Board of Governors of City Hospital, 286 App. Div. 542,
145 N. Y. S. 2d 534 (1955); Jacobs v. Martin, 20 N. J. 531, 90 A. 2d 151 (1952);
Bryant v. City of Lakeland, 158 Fla. 151, 28 S. 2d 106 (1946); Johnson v.
Ripon, 259 Wis. 84, 47 N. W. 328; Dade County v. Trombly, 102 S. 2d 394
(Fla. 1958); Group Health Cooperative v. King Co. Medical Society, 39
Wash. 2d 586; 237 P. 2d 737 (1951); also 280 S. W. 2d 236 (Ark. 1955); and
see 41 C. J. S. 336, 24 A. L. R. 2d 850, 26 Am. Jur. 592.
In Alpert v. Board of Governors of City Hospital (supra), the court
stated that there is no constitutional right to practice medicine in a public
hospital but that valuable privileges are also entitled to protection of law,
and a qualified physician, admitted to practice in a public hospital, acquires
a species of tenure and cannot be capriciously excluded and thereby injured
financially and professionally, without notice and an opportunity to be
heard.
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Many cases have dealt, both in private and in public hos-
pitals, with the competence of the individual to practice medicine
or a specific branch of medicine. While some variations will be
presented below, a clear and beautifully written opinion is that
of Justice Terrell in Green v. City of St. Petersburg7 as follows:
To contend that being a resident tax payer and practic-
ing physician of the city gives him a constitutional right to
the unrestricted use of the facilities of a hospital provided
by the city presents a test of our constitutional theory that
we have not heretofore been confronted with. It is a test
that takes more for a solvent than mere dogma, or a pair of
scissors, a pot of paste and an ipsi dixit. The practice of ma-
jor surgery is a highly specialized field and is recognized as a
delicate art. The majority of physicians admit that it requires
special skill and training and do not (pretend to) enter that
field. It is an art that cannot be acquired by technical train-
ing alone, but must come through actual practice and ex-
perience. Skill in materia medica in no sense connotes skill
in major surgery. It is utterly futile to contend in our day
that one be permitted to take a scalpel in hand and explore
the cranium, the thorax, or the abdomen and patch the vis-
cera, remove a tumor or amputate a limb before he demon-
strates his qualification to do so. Most assuredly when a
municipality furnishes a hospital, operating room, and the
other facilities for doing this and is responsible to patients
for the negligent use of these facilities, it has a right to know
that they are placed in the hands of an expert. If this is not
true, the city and the tax payer have no protection whatever.
It would project the doctrine of freedom and equality
into unwarranted areas to hold that one could practice major
surgery with facilities furnished by the city when he has
nothing more than a diploma from a medical school and a
certificate from the State Board of Medical Examiners to
warrant his skill in that field...
Constitutional guarantees were not designed to intercept
or stalemate progress in these factors; neither were they in-
tended to hamper a community in raising the standard of its
schools, hospitals, and other institutions, as high as reason
and circumstances dictate. In this case, the people of St.
Petersburg have elected to own and support a hospital of
7 Green v. City of St. Petersburg, Fla. supra, n. 6. In a concurring opinion,
Justice Chapman said: "The challenged rules, obviously, were promulgated
in behalf of the hospital and for the protection of patients undergoing major
operations against possible unethical and unskilled licensed practitioners.
It seems to me that such reasonable rules promote the interest of the public
and general welfare and likewise encourage a high professional standard of
requirements for major surgery. It is clear that these rules close the door
against possible dope fiends, liquor heads, and practitioners not qualified to
perform major surgical operations. The general interest of such patients
must be protected simultaneously with advancement in the practice of
surgery."
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approved high standards and none of them are complaining.
Appellant says that he should not be required to bring him-
self en rapport with the standards imposed by the com-
munity in which he proposes to practice. He does not inti-
mate that the standards imposed are too high or out of line
with those generally approved for the conduct of a first class
hospital. If this thesis be sound, then there is no standard
of excellence that the City can impose to protect itself against
the assault made...
He is well within his right to seek relief against un-
reasonable application of a rule but not against one that re-
quires the same standard of excellence from (him) that it
requires of all in his class.
Bryant v. City of Lakeland8 illustrates the nature of the
rules found in most hospitals. The regulations of hospitals stand-
ardize care, keeping it at a high ethical and professional level.
Here the rules provided that (1) physicians attend 75% of the
meetings of the Staff, keep accurate records, and complete rec-
ords within seventy-two hours after discharge, and (2) no patient
may be taken to surgery unless the following are on the patient's
chart: complete physical examination, pre-operative diagnosis,
and laboratory report. They also required, in all cases of thera-
peutic abortion, that there be two consultations with other
physicians, one of whom must be an obstetrician. A doctor was
charged with non-compliance with the regulations and unprofes-
sional conduct. The hospital board held meetings on January 16,
1946, which the doctor attended, on February 12, and March 8,
which he did not, on March 12, when formal charges were made
to him, on March 15, when he did not appear, finally resulting in
the recommendation of suspension on March 21. On April 4, the
City Commissioners met and suspended him; he did not appear,
but later filed suit for malicious conspiracy. The court said that
it is not incumbent upon the city to maintain a hospital for the
private practice of medicine, nor does a physician have a consti-
tutional or statutory right to practice his profession in the city's
hospital. Reasonable rules and regulations may be prescribed as
to qualifications to practice in public hospitals as well as to the
procedures of the practice. It is obvious that this type of re-
striction is inherently beneficial, if applied reasonably, without
discrimination or prejudice.
This case illustrates the protection given to the physician by
8 Bryant v. City of Lakeland, supra, n. 6. In Dade County v. Trombly,
supra, n. 6, the hospital required that physicians be graduates of approved
medical schools, have approved internships, and be competent in the line of
work or type of medicine practiced. Here the doctor had not been gradu-
ated from an approved medical school, did not serve in an approved resi-
dency, and to aggravate matters, two of his references stated that he was
not qualified to do major surgery which he wished to do and the third
reference said that he was qualified only for certain procedures. The court,
of course, said that the right to practice was a privilege, not a right.
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the right to present his case. In another public hospital case,9 a
suspension was declared void because the doctor had had no hear-
ing. That the doctor has some protection against the whims of a
city administration was seen in the Jacobs v. Martin case'0 where
the city and its directors had failed to adopt rules and regulations
governing qualifications to do major surgery. The director of the
hospital, a member of the city government, claimed that he could
act "at his pleasure." The court ruled that this was arbitrary and
contrary to public policy and good administration.
In Henderson v. City of Knoxville" a physician was accused
by the staff of splitting fees, which in Tennessee was under stat-
utory prohibition. He was reinstated because of insufficient evi-
dence that he had solicited patients directly. In a Wyoming case
12
the hospital trustees sought a declaratory judgment from the
court that they could suspend a physician if he failed to comply
with the rules.
A very important case where the courts intervened to pre-
vent the exclusion from public hospitals of physicians who were
employed by a group health cooperative was Group Health Co-
operative v. King County Medical Society.13 This case will un-
doubtedly be the reference point for many subsequent decisions.
The situation in each state must be evaluated in the light of
its own statutes, some examples of which are presented below.
9 Johnson v. Ripon, supra, n. 6. A regulation for the suspension of a right
of a duly licensed physician residing in a municipality owning and operat-
ing a public hospital is not reasonable unless provision is made for notice
and hearing.
10 Jacobs v. Martin, supra, n. 6.
11 Henderson v. City of Knoxville, 157 Tenn. 477, 9 S. W. 2d 697, 60 A. L. R.
652 (1928). The governing body of a hospital may propertly permit all li-
censed physicians to practice therein, and it has been held that any licensed
physician, as long as he stays within the law, has the right to practice in
the public hospitals of the state.
12 Board of Trustees of Memorial Hospital of Sheridan County v. Platt, 72
Wyo. 120, 262 P. 2d 682 (1953).
13 Group Health Cooperative v. King County Medical Society, supra, n. 6;
see also 280 S. W. 2d 236 (Ark. 1955) for certain aspects of this case based
on requirements of membership in a county medical society. Where ex-
clusion of group health cooperative's physician from public hospital on sole
ground that physicians were practicing group medicine was unreasonable,
arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory, the public hospital and its officers
and agents and commissioners and physicians attached to its medical staff
would be enjoined from following any course of conduct having for its
purpose such exclusion of cooperative's physician from the medical staff
of the public hospital. Persons acting for municipal hospital in selection of
medical staff members may not do so in an unreasonable, arbitrary, ca-
pricious or discriminatory manner, whether such persons are the elected
commissioners or members of the medical staff and whether the hospital
is being operated in a governmental or proprietary capacity. Private hos-
pitals have the right to exclude licensed physicians from the use of their
facilities, such exclusion resting within the discretion of the managing au-
thorities. Where the acts of public officers are arbitrary, tyrannical, or
predicated upon a fundamentally wrong basis, the courts may interfere to
protect the rights of the individuals.
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In Selden v. City of Sterling14 it was stated that the object of a
statute, giving all physicians equal privileges in treating patients
in public hospitals, is the prevention of discrimination, and the
statute does not prevent directors of public hospitals from adopt-
ing rules to maintain a standard of proficiency for the public
safety and welfare.
Private Hospitals
The basic law as applied to private hospitals has been well
stated in Van Campen v. Olean General Hospital.1"
The selection and retention of physicians to treat pati-
ents admitted to the hospital are matters of judgment and
discipline. The power to appoint usually implies the power
to remove. In common experience, instances are not unusu-
al where some physicians disagree with hospital manage-
ment. When such disagreement becomes so pronounced as
to interfere with orderly management and discipline, and
when there is persistent violation and disobedience of neces-
sary rules and regulations, we think the directors may bring
the inharmonious conditions to an end by summary action.
They are not required, in our judgment, to give notice and
conduct a trial in every such case...
The law does not require a corporation like defendant to
furnish its services and accommodations to everyone who
applies, whether patient or physician. There can be no abso-
lute right in individuals to claim the benefits of its privileges.
Such a thing would be impossible. There must be discretion
vested in the management to make selection for applicants
with regard to accommodations available... Nor do we deem
it such discrimination, if from a large number of physicians
it selects members of its visiting staff with regard, not only to
their medical skill, but to their adaptability to the rules and
discipline of the institution. Even in public hospitals, the
same rule in the selection of.. . physicians must apply.
The principles as stated are well established.'
6
14 Selden v. City of Sterling, 316 Ill. App. 455, 45 N. E. 2d 329 (1942).
15 Van Campen v. Olean General Hospital, 210 App. Div. 204, 205 N. Y. S.
554 (1924), aff'd. 239 N. Y. 615, 147 N. E. 219 (1925).
16 Strauss v. Marlboro County General Hospital, 185 So. Car. 425, 194 S. E.
65 (1937); Levin v. Sinai Hospital of Baltimore City, supra, n. 2; Hughes v.
Good Samaritan Hospital, supra, n. 2; People ex rel. P. S. Replogle v. The
Julia F. Burnham Hospital, 71 Ill. App. 246 (1896); State ex rel. Wolf v.
LaCrosse Lutheran Hospital Ass'n., 181 Wis. 33, 193 N. W. 994 (1923); West
Coast Hospital Ass'n. v. Hoare, supra, n. 2; Harris v. Thomas, 217 S. W.
1068 (Tex. 1920); Loewinthan v. Beth David Hospital, 9 N. Y; S. 2d 367
(1938); Joseph v. Passaic Hospital Ass'n., 26 N. J. 557, 141 A. 2d 18 (1958);
Glass v. Doctor's Hospital, 213 Md. 44, 131 A. 2d 254 (1957); Akopiantz v.
Board of County Com'rs., supra, n. 2; Edson v. Griffin Hospital, supra, n. 2;
Natale v. Sisters of Mercy, supra, n. 2; Eaton v. Board of Managers of James
Walker Memorial Hospital, supra, n. 4.
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Based on the corporate status of hospitals, the board of di-
rectors must function within the stipulations of the corporate
constitution. Thus, in one case, a physician was removed from
the staff of a hospital in accordance with an amendment adopted
contrary to the rules of the constitution. A court of equity grant-
ed relief by enjoining his removal from the staff.17
The governing body of a hospital may make reasonable rules
and regulations concerning qualifications of physicians allowed
in the hospital. Thus, in one very interesting case' 8 a physician
was removed from the staff after the board of directors adopted a
by-law involving medical ethics. Included in this code, taken
from the standards of the American Medical Association, was
the prohibition against public advertisements, promises of radical
cures, public hand bills, and the keeping secret of the contents of
medicines. The plaintiff, "in order to obtain patronage, resorted
to public advertising, and printed handbills or circulars wherein
he promised radical and wonderful cures, and boasted of his su-
perior medical knowledge, skill and success; invited persons af-
fected with diseases to employ him; set forth certificates show-
ing that extraordinary successes attended his treatment in many
different cases, and proffered to examine patients and give medi-
cal advice without charge." He also, prior to service, had patients
sign over their wages. "It appeared also, the appellant, in the
newspapers and by way of circulars, advertised as an in-
corporated 'Medical and Surgical Institute and Sanitarium,' hav-
ing a president and secretary, when in fact there was no such
corporate company" (this being a violation of the criminal stat-
utes of the state). Turning down his plea, the court said: Under
the by-law, he had but to abandon practices which the common
judgment of his professional brethren branded as discreditable
and which are so commonly resorted to by quacks and charla-
tans.
In a case which illustrates another reason for removal, based
on incompatability, 19 a physician was removed from the staff of
a hospital which he had originally founded as a propietary hos-
pital, and which he later turned over to a non-profit corporation
and a board of trustees who were prominent men in the com-
munity. He refused to accept the authority of the board, but at-
tempted to run the hospital as he had in the days when he and
his family owned the hospital. The court commented that it was
regrettable that the appellant could no longer participate in the
activities of the institution that he had founded, but that "he him-
self is responsible for the fact that he has no redress .... The
record is replete with evidence that Dr. Glass was an obstacle in
17 James A. Stevens v. The Emergency Hospital of Easton, 142 Md. 526
(1923).
18 People ex rel. P. S. Replogle v. The Julia F. Burnham Hospital, supra,
n. 16.
19 Glass v. Doctors' Hospital, supra, n. 16.
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the control of the hospital by the board, that he was not amen-
able to discipline, which he often required, and that his presence
led to an inharmonious working of the hospital. It is clear that
he was either unable, or refused, to comport himself effectively
and agreeably within the framework of the charitable hospital
conducted on a high plane by a public spirited and sincere board
of trustees, as such hospitals generally are conducted, and that
this attitude created the situation which justified the exercise of
an honest discretion by the board leading to his elimination from
the scene."
Another case of refusal to reappoint to medical staff for fail-
ure to comply with hospital rules was Joseph v. Passaic Hospital
Assn.20 where a physician was removed after many years on the
staff of the hospital.
Thus, the basic law concerning private hospitals is that based
on the powers vested in a private corporation. Those who would
attack this system must consider the following questions: (1)-
Who is to maintain control and authority?, and (2)-if private
corporations such as hospitals lose the power to control their own
affairs, where shall such a deviation from present public policy
stop? Would this extend to all charitable and benevolent organi-
zations or even further? What would be the effect on all corpo-
rate law?
To summarize this aspect, the comment of the court in West
Coast Hospital v. Hoare21 is worthy of study.
Private hospitals had been in existence for a long period
of time. They were organized by people with social con-
science and who desired to utilize their means and talents
for research and for the relief of suffering humanity. The
ownership, control, and management of such hospitals were
left with those who conceived and organized them or with
the managing authorities provided for in the plan of organi-
zation and management. Such managing authorities had the
power and the authority to enlarge and expand such insti-
tutions, to carry on research and determine what persons
should be granted the privilege of practicing the healing arts
in such institutions. It is doubtful if many of the great pri-
vate hospitals of this country would have been established
and would have rendered the service which has been render-
ed if the managing authorities had been subject to the con-
trol of regulation of the government or public officials as to
what persons should be granted the privilege of practicing
in such institutions.
20 Joseph v. Passaic Hospital Ass'n., supra, n. 16.
21 West Coast Hospital Ass'n. v. Hoare, supra, n. 2. Here the hospital was
deemed a private corporation as the annual contribution from the city
amounted to only one percent of the total annual revenue.
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Surgery, Medical Specialization and Hospital Privileges
Let us now turn to discussion of some of the groups allegedly
injured by present law. A large number of cases dealing with
hospital privileges concern restrictions on the right to practice
surgery.
22
Typical cases are those of Hughes v. Good Samaritan Hos-
pita12 3 and Edson v. Griffin Hospital.24 In the former case a
general practitioner was barred from performing surgical oper-
ations in the defendant hospital. The hospital, to remain ac-
credited, required that surgeons be endorsed by the American
College of Surgeons.
In the latter case, a physician, who had been on the staff of
a hospital for eleven years, was denied the right to use the
facilities of the hospital in performing certain major surgical
procedures. He called the rules arbitrary and unreasonable; but
the court pointed out that the rules were similar to those of
standard hospitals. Testimony from nationally recognized authori-
ties classed them as reasonable and in accord with modern
hospital practice. The hospital board refused to make an ex-
ception in his case, because he lacked sufficient training.
Other cases are repetitious. The main points are these: In
the first decade in the twentieth century, American medicine,
hospitals and medical education all functioned at a primitive,
poorly organized level. Thanks to the work of Abraham Flexner,
American medical education was revolutionized. In a massive
step, one-half of the medical schools were closed. Many were
diploma mills, selling certificates after, in some cases, only a few
weeks of instruction or even none at all. In the last fifty years,
tremendous advances in knowledge and specialization took place.
The American Medical Association and the various hospital
associations made their most notable contributions to our society
in this sphere. Slowly and inevitably, in all aspects of medicine,
the specialist took over specialized care; and as he did so, self-
proclaimed experts were gradually eliminated from the scene.
Today, in the large city hospitals, to become a member of a
specialized department of medicine requires specialized training
in that field. The general practitioner was slowly eliminated from
performing those procedures in which he had not been trained.
Many of the legal cases, thus, have been brought by those fight-
ing the increasing number of restrictions. There can be no doubt
22 Jacobs v. Martin, supra, n. 6; Dade County v. Trombly, supra, n. 6;
Green v. City of St. Petersburg, supra, n. 6; Dayan v. Wood River Twp.
Hospital, supra, n. 6; Strauss v. Marlboro County General Hospital, supra,
n. 16; State ex rel. Wolf v. LaCrosse Lutheran Hospital Assn., supra, n. 16;
Akopiantz v. Board of County Com'rs, supra, n. 2- (a hospital built by a
county and leased to an association is a private hospital. The decision deny-
ing medical and surgical privileges is not subject to judicial review). Also
Hughes v. Good Samaritan Hospital, supra, n. 2; Edson v. Griffin Hospital,
supra, n. 2.
23 Hughes v. Good Samaritan Hospital, supra, n. 2.
24 Edson v. Griffin Hospital, supra, n. 2.
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that restrictions in this sphere have been beneficial to the com-
munity at large, as well as in raising the level of professional
practice, both individually and in the hospital. Justice Terrell's
words in this regard, may well be remembered. 25
Today, American medicine is the most specialized in the
world; it is also in the forefront of world medicine. The age of
specialization, despite those who lament the "good old days," is
only beginning. Nothing must be allowed to interfere with the
standardization of medical care at ever higher levels.
Quacks, Faddists, and Other Practitioners of the Healing Arts
The laws of the various states regarding the practice of
medicine are riddled with the customs of antiquity. In many
states the public has very little protection against all forms of
nonsense performed in the name of medicine. In some states,
especially in the West and Southwest, so-called "hospitals" ad-
vertise cancer cures based on secret chemical treatments. While
some actions to control this "medicine" are taken under Federal
law, these states have inadequate statutory safeguards.
Other so-called "schools of medicine" have various degrees
of legislative acceptance. Osteopathy is the school outside of
orthodox medical channels with the highest standards; yet os-
teopathy is poorly set up at this point for the specialized practice
of medicine, except in certain isolated areas. Various laws give
privileges to chiropractors, naturopaths, mechanotherapists,
Christian Scientists, practitioners of naprapathy and a whole
host of other "healers." These are denied privileges in hospitals
associated with the American Hospital Association and American
Medical Association.
Generally, rules and regulations which operate to exclude
practitioners of various particular schools or systems of medicine
or treatment, such as osteopathy or chiropractic, have been up-
held as against various objections in the case of both public and
private institutions.26
In the Hayman case27 the Supreme Court ruled that the
exclusion of osteopaths from a city hospital did not violate a
Texas law that no preference shall be given by law to any schools
of medicine.
Harris v. Thomas- S was a prominent case in this regard. The
plaintiff was restricted in his use of facilities at a Catholic insti-
25 Supra, n. 7.
26 Hayman v. Galveston, 273 U. S. 414, 47 S. Ct. 363, 71 L. Ed. 714 (1927);
Newton v. Board of Com'rs. 86 Colo. 446, 282 P. 1068 (1929); Richardson v.
Miami, 144 Fla. 294, 198 S. 51 (1940); Lambing v. Board of Commissioners,
45 Idaho 468, 263 P. 992 (1928); Re Osteopathy in Hospitals, 8 Pa. D & C
273 (Pa., 1926), Harris v. Thomas, 217 S. W. 1068 (Tex. 1920); Duson v.
Poage, 318 S. W. 2d 89 (Tex. 1958); contra: Stribling v. Jolley, 241 Mo. App.
1123, 253 S. W. 2d 519 (1952).
27 Hayman v. Galveston, supra, n. 26.
28 Harris v. Thomas, supra, n. 26.
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tution. He stated that he was licensed to practice medicine, oste-
opathy, and surgery, that he had been graduated from the School
of Osteopathy in Kirksville, Missouri, in 1898, and that he had
received a medical degree from the Pacific Medical College in
Los Angeles in 1915. The rest of the staff, all M. D.'s, threatened
to resign from the staff; the nurses refused to care for his patients.
He also claimed that a rule requiring the presence of three doc-
tors at surgery was designed to hamper him. At this time, Catho-
lic hospitals were being standardized on a national basis; he
claimed that this was an attempt to create a monopoly. The
Sisters in charge of the hospital did not take an active role in
the case, expressing a willingness to abide by the court's ruling.
He claimed that he had been slandered and was being damaged
at the rate of $5,000 per year. The defendant doctors alleged that
he was licensed as an osteopath, not as a physician or surgeon,
that he had obtained his D. 0. degree after a one-year course,
that the Pacific Medical College was not a recognized school, that
he attended this school for six weeks as a subterfuge so that he
could advertise himself as an M. D. They also pointed out that in
1907, the Medical Board of Texas had established that osteopathy
at that time did not teach therapeutics, drugs, and other sub-
jects taught in medical schools. He lost.
In Duson v. Poage29 an osteopath was excluded from a coun-
ty hospital after the M. D.'s and R. N.'s resigned and the voca-
tional nurses threatened to resign. They claimed that the hospital
could not receive accreditation, that the nurses and interns train-
ing could not be approved, and that insurance collections were
hampered as long as an osteopath remained on the staff. The
court held that osteopaths may be excluded from the hospital
staff, saying that: "If in a given community, the hospital can best
be operated by the exclusion of osteopaths, we find no inhibition
in law to such exclusion."
A striking contradiction to the above case occurred in Mis-
souri,30 where an osteopath was allowed staff privileges, in
compliance with the wording of a Missouri statute preventing
discrimination against any school of medicine. The presence in
Missouri of a large osteopathic school also may have been a
factor.
To be fair to osteopaths, the standards of osteopathic schools
have risen in recent years, and in the past few years, there have
been periodic negotiations between the American Medical Associ-
ation and the American Osteopathic Association for greater
collaboration. Thus, in the near future, changes in the modus
vivendi may occur. At this time the biggest handicap that osteo-
paths face is limited opportunities in their own hospital network
for adequate specialty training. In any event, the lawyer should
29 Duson v. Poage, supra, n. 26.
80 Stribling v. Jolley, supra, n. 26.
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be aware that at present, medicine and osteopathy are, in general,
mutually exclusive schools of medical practice, and that presently
many states limit by statute the type of practice allowed to
osteopaths.
As to other schools of medicine, there is little that can be
said as to any justification for their existence.
Religious Factors
Information as to the exclusion of physicians based on
religious factors from hospital practices is sparse. No case on
point was encountered. I have heard of complaints based on the
dictation of medical policies in hospitals run by religious groups
counter to the beliefs of individual doctors or medical practices
in general. Those who are critical state that in some communities
the only hospital is run by a specific religious group (with public
contributions for hospital support) and that the hospital itself
dictates some medical policy. This is obviously an uncommon
situation, especially in cities where the number of hospitals al-
lows alternatives. Those who would justify such a practice can
point simply to the fact that those organizing and supporting a
hospital would do so in accordance with their religious beliefs.
One interesting case was Natale v. Sisters of Mercy.31 A
physician was removed from the medical staff of a Catholic
hospital because he had not complied with the hospital rules in
becoming a member of the county medical society, or with the
requirement of good character and conduct in accord with gen-
erally accepted moral standards; also on the ground that the
hospital was a private corporation. Actually, the basic factor in
the case was the notoriety of the divorce case of the physician.
The couple had been married by a Justice of the Peace with the
idea that if the marriage were successful, there would be a
church marriage. The wife was a suspicious person, who per-
petually accused the husband of infidelity, and at the divorce
proceedings there were mutual airings of extramarital affairs.
The court said: "It is our conclusion, and it is virtually conceded
by defendants, that the impelling reason for the action which
they took against the plaintiff was the unfavorable newspaper
and radio notoriety connected with the divorce proceedings."
Thus, in this case, the doctor was excluded because of the no-
toriety of his amorous affairs. Therefore, a church-run hospital
has the authority to set the standards for the moral behavior of
its physicians.
Racial Factors
That there is discrimination against certain racial groups-
primarily Negroes-in the use of hospital facilities, cannot be
denied. This practice varies considerably in accordance with
general area and within each area. Obviously the most stringent
31 Natale v. Sisters of Mercy, supra, n. 2.
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restrictions occur in the Southland, in accordance with the
peculiarities of the customs of the people of that area. Discrimi-
nation here is almost total, with Negro physicians being denied
membership in state medical societies, and almost all rights in
hospitals, even to the extent in some places of denial of the right
to treat Negro patients. In the North, practices vary considerably,
and I do not have sufficient information concerning this topic.
A pertinent case is that of Eaton v. Board of Managers of
James Walker Memorial Hospital.32 In this case, three Negro
physicians sought a declaratory judgment as to their right to
practice in a North Carolina hospital. They based their claim on
the fact that the hospital was a public hospital; but they were
denied because of the ruling that the hospital was a private cor-
poration receiving public support by contract and that only to
the extent of 4.6% of the hospital's income. The court said:
The plaintiffs rightfully confine their effort on this ap-
peal to showing that the hospital is an instrumentality of the
State. They do not argue that the exclusion of qualified
physicians solely because of their race from an institution
devoted to the care of the sick is indefensible, as they might
well do if this Court was the proper forum to determine the
ethical quality of the action. As a Federal Court, we are
powerless to take into account this aspect of the case. We
may not interfere unless there is State Action which offends
the Federal Constitution.
The court gave as an example of the latter the case of Kerr
v. Enoch Pratt Free Library of Baltimore City.3 3 There the court
struck down the exclusion of Negroes from a library training
course conducted by an instrumentality of the state.
The extent of the problems facing Negro physicians is de-
scribed in the Proceedings of the Imhotep National Conference
on Hospital Integration. 34 Obviously, discrimination facing physi-
cians does not differ greatly from that facing Negroes in other
facets of our society. It might even be said that in some regards,
progress in medicine is in advance of other concurrent social
problems. One handicap facing Negro physicians is that a rela-
tively small number of Negro physicians are certified in medical
specialties. For instance, in 1956, of 60,644 certified medical
specialists in the United States, only 283 were Negroes. Whether
this is due to economic factors which force Negro physicians
into practice earlier than other doctors, or whether it reflects
discrimination in obtaining advanced medical education, or
32 Eaton v. Board of Managers of James Walker Memorial Hospital, supra,
n. 4.
33 Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library of Baltimore City, 149 F. 2d 212 (4th
Cir. 1945).
34 Proceedings, Imhotep National Conference on Hospital Integration, Wash-
ington, D. C., March 8-9, 1957.
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol9/iss1/17
HOSPITAL PRIVILEGES REVISITED
whether it is due to other factors, I do not know. On the other
hand, in Chicago, where 68 of 236 Negro physicians were certi-
fied specialists (in 1956), only fifteen physicians had hospital
appointments and these in seven of the approximately seventy
hospitals in Chicago.3 5
That a problem exists is undeniable. The extent of the prob-
lem, the means of improving the situation and the role of the
law in this social problem are subjects worthy of special con-
sideration. As with many other aspects of the prejudices that
plague the American scene, the exact means of handling these
problems are not easily discerned. But inevitably, one way or
another, society will demand that the grosser abuses be elimi-
nated. On the positive side of our sociological ledger, there have
been many advances in this particular field in the last ten years,
primarily in the North and West.
Some Comments on Hospital Functioning
The basic law on the subject of hospital privileges has been
covered. For one to have some understanding of the law in a
certain field, it is necessary to have an idea of that field as well
as of the applicable law. The nature of hospital functioning as it
exists necessitates certain policies. If one is to change these
policies, one must keep in mind the accompanying effect on cur-
rent hospital practices. The absolute impracticality of certain
suggestions will then become clear.
For instance, the suggestion that hospitals should have totally
open hospital staffs has been made. It has been shown that re-
strictions have been placed in order to keep out the poorly
trained, the quacks, and the unethical. State laws in general are
archaic, inadequate and practically useless for the raising of
standards. The present medical system has raised the standards
despite existing statutory law. The legal system does not lend
itself to this problem, as standards must vary from one hospital
to another, based on location, resources, etc. The standard at a
university hospital cannot be maintained in a poor rural area
(or even a rich rural area). The best tool that society has for
maintenance of high standards is local authority, reasonably
applied. It is not necessary to reiterate, at this point, the various
controls in hospitals.
A second point concerns the nature of hospitals. Some
hospitals deal with general medicine, others deal in ultra-
specialized techniques. Some hospitals have a prime interest in
medical education, and it is this aspect that is an overriding factor
in staff appointments. It must be remembered that, in general, it
is often the hospital with the most restrictions that is the best
hospital because it has the most rigid standards. A university
hospital often has a tremendous staff of ultra-specialists. The
general practitioner may be almost totally excluded, because
35 Ibid.
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he does not have the specialized background for specialized
teaching or research. Not only that, but the usual university
hospital, with its accent on teaching, turns out great numbers of
specialists who cannot possibly be absorbed by the hospital staff.
There is a useful social factor in this in that the specialists then
trickle out to the community in general.
Each hospital represents a different and unique situation.
One large hospital in Cleveland, with high standards for hospital
appointment, has a staff of one hundred and sixty-eight doctors
who treat patients in medical-surgical facilities totaling two
hundred and seventy-five beds. This large training hospital had
a 1958 occupancy rate in the medical-surgical wards of 96.8%,
which is a fantastic percentage. Therefore, one cannot argue that
beds are sitting empty, depriving patients and doctors of their
use. This hospital has eighteen interns and forty-eight residents.
About twenty to thirty doctors finish training each year. Obvi-
ously it is impossible for this hospital to absorb all of its own
trainees, much less doctors from elsewhere.
Another Cleveland hospital of three hundred and twenty-
five beds (all types) has an attending staff of seventy to seventy-
five doctors, eight interns, and twenty residents. This hospital
can absorb its own trainees. It has a training program in surgery;
but it has no training program in pediatrics. Therefore, its
pediatricians must come from outside the instituton. This hospital
has an occupancy rate of 95%, which is extremely high when one
takes into account the need to hold some emergency beds, the
fluctuations in obstetrics and pediatrics, and the influence of
holidays.
There are other factors to consider. As a concomitant of
staff appointment, doctors are required to spend a certain amount
of time in free clinic work and in teaching interns and residents.
The hospital administration, as represented by its medical board,
must maintain control over who is to do these activities.
Other hospitals assume certain identities based on religious
factors and association with specific nationality groups.
The organizations of hospitals differ. In some the doctor has
primarily the duty of caring for his patients. In others he must
comply with a large teaching or charity or research program.
It is also important to keep in mind that relatively few hos-
pitals are public corporations. Many are associated with religious
groups, universities, or other charitable organizations. In order
to be successful in the solicitation of funds, especially in the large
cities, identification with the group that supports the hospital
is fostered. Is this to be denied? If Al Capp wishes to interest
his friends in establishing a hospital for the care of Lower Slob-
bovians, to be staffed by Lower Slobbovian doctors, is this to be
denied?
There are many other factors to be considered but this brief
sketch will give some ideas of the problems involved.
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Conclusion
It is the opinion of this writer that the laws relating to hos-
pital privileges basically are sound and in the public interest.
There is no clear reason to overthrow the accumulated wisdom
of the last hundred years. American hospitals have become the
best in the world because of the freedom with which they have
been allowed to function. This does not militate against the con-
stant march for improvement. As can be seen, there are cases
where individuals are handicapped in their use of hospitals.
These situations reflect social problems, not defects in existing
laws which, like our Constitutional rights, sometimes are some-
what unsatisfactory in their application.
Basically then, no physician has an absolute right to prac-
tice in a hospital. It would be a sad day if such a right were ever
to exist. For it is the qualifications and restrictions on the privi-
lege to practice in a hospital that have helped to eliminate the
quack, the poorly trained, the maladjusted, and the numerous
others who have plagued the American medical profession and the
public.
The policies of law as to hospitals have vastly benefited our
society. Those who claim that they are contrary to public policy
have a great burden of proof. Those who would listen to the har-
bingers of change have a greater one.
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